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Aleksanteri Institute, Finnish Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki,
Finland
ABSTRACT
Two trends increasingly guiding the governance of Islam in Russia
are political authoritarianisation and the global securitisation of
Islam. Given that suspicions of loyalty so often configure in public
discussions about Islam, Muslim leaders are compelled to
continuously emphasise their patriotism. This article analyses
recent mediated debates about Islam, in which the discursive
boundary between ‘radical, non-traditional’ and ‘moderate,
traditional’ Islam are being negotiated. The author argues that in
the 2000s, the pressure to display loyalty has narrowed the scope
of what is considered acceptable behaviour for Muslim leaders.
Yet at the same time, these Muslim leaders cleverly adopt
arguments and popular catchwords from the rhetoric of the
political elite in order to emphasise the role of Islam in Russian
society and tradition. In doing so, they seek to influence public
discourse about Russian identity and defend the position of








In February 2015, a small Islamic organisation called the United Islamic Congress of
Russia and its head, Shavkat Avyasov, made an appeal to President Putin and Mayor
Sergey Sobyanin of Moscow:
We, the patriotically oriented segment of Muslims of Russia, have addressed the leadership
of the country with a request for permission to build in Moscow a mosque named after Vla-
dimir Vladimirovich Putin, so that his name would be preserved among the nations of our
multinational Fatherland for centuries. (Mechet Imeni 2015)1
Avyasov explained that ‘Muslims consider Vladimir Putin to be an epochal personality,
who was sent by the Almighty to lead our Fatherland into an era of a Golden Dawn, to
save the world from Western immorality and the fascist plague’ (Mechet Imeni 2015).
The servility of the appeal was widely condemned and ridiculed in Russian Islamic
social media. As tragicomic as the attempt and the wording of the appeal may seem, it
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can also be read as an innovative approach to a situation where Muslim communities
throughout Russia face difficulties in receiving permission to build new mosques.
There are currently only four mosques for the nearly one million Muslims in Moscow.
The Dagestani journalist and blogger Umar Butaev (2015) notes: ‘In my view,
Shavkat-khadzhi [an honorary title for a person who has conducted hajji to Mecca]
made this – to say it openly – vile request simply because he felt that no other form of
leverage remained at his disposal.’ Although the authorities did not respond positively
to the appeal, at least it has not hindered the career development of its initiators. In
November 2016, an imam who had supported the proposal of naming a mosque after
Putin in a YouTube video was named the leading imam of the Yardyam Mosque in
Moscow (Iman 2016).
The case of the ‘Putin mosque’ reflects the growing presence of patriotic and loyalist
rhetoric in the speeches of Russian muftis, imams and heads of Islamic organisations.
This trend is the result of common suspicions directed at the Muslim minority and man-
ifested in accusations of disloyalty to the state. Increased policing, tightened regulations
and suspicions of disloyalty are all features characterising the governance of Islam in
post-9/11 Europe and North America (Edmunds 2012; Sunier 2014). However, in
Russia the tightened control of Islam also follows the general political authoritarianisa-
tion and decline of religious freedom throughout the country (Fagan 2013). Therefore,
in the Russian governance of Islam, political authoritarianisation and the global securi-
tisation of Islam are intersecting developments.
The main question of this article is as follows: How does the need to articulate loyalty
and patriotism shape the rhetoric of Islamic actors? The analysis examines both how the
borders of acceptable rhetoric are negotiated and policed as well as how Islamic actors
adapt to, challenge and use it to their benefit in specific situations. The main argument
of this article is that the need to emphasise their loyalty and patriotism narrows the scope
of what Islamic leaders can legitimately say in public. However, patriotism also serves as a
strategic tool that Muslims use to protect their interests in Russian society.
The intensified control of Muslims in Russia as part of a global
securitisation of Islam
In recent decades, and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, alarmist discussions
about the threat of radical and militant Islam have intensified around the world, with
Russia being no exception (Verkhovsky 2010, 30). This trend has given new weight to
already existing voices that demand stricter control of Muslim minorities. A crucial
element in the governance of Islam in the post-9/11 world is identifying specific features
of Islam and Muslim actors that need special surveillance and control. Both media rep-
resentations of Islam and the administrative rhetoric in, for example, policy papers on
religious politics or how to prevent radicalisation tend to juxtapose ‘good’ and ‘bad’
Islam. Analyses of this kind of dichotomy have noted similarities throughout the
Western hemisphere, with militancy and illiberalism as well as a lack of loyalty constitut-
ing the main dominators of an undesirable form of Islam (Haddad and Golson 2007;
Loobuyck, Debeer, and Meier 2013). However, the definitions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
Islam, as well as the extent to which countries should control or govern Islam, are
sites of constant negotiation and struggle connected to different political ideologies.
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Despite many similarities, discussions about Muslims in Russia differ somewhat from
those taking place in Western Europe. One of the main differences is that Russian discus-
sions do not connect Islam with migrants as often as in the West because the Russian
Empire had long included several large Muslim minorities, including Tatars, Bashkirs,
Chechens, Circassians and Azeris. In parts of the Middle Volga and Northern Caucasus
regions, Muslims form the majority of the population. Islam is regarded as one of the
‘traditional’ religions of Russia and an integral part of the country’s history. Representa-
tives of the Muslim community are routinely invited to state events and participate in the
work of many high-level commissions and institutions. Therefore, it is common to hear
both ordinary Russians and Russian scholars argue that Islam is regarded more positively
in Russia than in Western Europe. The Russian scholars of nationalism Malakhov and
Letnyakov (2018, 253–255) point out that mainstream ‘systematic’ parties and politicians
cannot deviate from the general political consensus, for example by portraying Islam as a
religion in overtly negative terms, because that would mean challenging the dominant
narrative about Russia as a country with a long history of religions harmoniously coex-
isting with each other.
This is undoubtedly true, as idea of Russia as a model case for the harmonious coex-
istence of Islam and Christianity is central both in the rhetoric of the political establish-
ment and Russians’ conceptualisations of their national identity. However, as Malakhov
and Letnyakov (2018, 254) note, Russian discussions are also characterised by normative
divisions. The main division is between an accepted ‘traditional’, national Islam and a
harmful, ‘non-traditional’ Islam – or between Islam and an ideological ‘misuse’ of
Islam that falls outside the category of religion. This kind of rhetorical manoeuvring
can be implemented to counter charges of Islamophobia and simultaneously to disguise
Islamophobic policies, such as banning Islamic literature and organisations on very ques-
tionable grounds.
The majority of media sites in Russia are either directly or indirectly controlled by the
state. The mainstream media often juxtaposes the Russian tradition of a peaceful coex-
istence of religions with exaggerated portrayals of the disrespect for Islam in Western
Europe (Aitamurto 2016). Dudoignon (2015, 552) notes that when Islamophobia is
addressed in Russia, the media usually focuses on it as a phenomenon occurring more
in a Western context. At the same time, a 2013 survey found that more than 60% of Rus-
sians feel Islam poses a threat to national security and Russian culture (Kolstø 2016, 40–
41; see also Rogozina 2018). Denying the existence of Islamophobia means that it cannot
be countered, effectively silencing any discussion about the topic.
Islamophobia has an effect on political rhetoric and decision-making as well. For
example, Tolz and Harding (2015) argue that after the massive nationalist riots in
2012, the main state-aligned TV channels launched a media campaign against migrants
and Islam in Russia. The coverage of migrants and Muslims as a source of social pro-
blems and a possible threat rapidly increased and the portrayal of these groups conse-
quently became more negative. Tolz and Harding suggest that this campaign reflected
the Kremlin’s search for a common enemy as the means to construct a clearer ideological
message based on nationalism. Appealing to the supporters of ethno-nationalism was
seen as a solution to declining levels of support among the population (Tolz and
Harding 2015).
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Several think tanks close to the political elite or the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC),
such as the Russian Institute for Strategic Research, have issued alarmist statements
about the spread of radical Islam. In such statements, all non-compliance is frequently
regarded as radicalism. However, the efforts to limit the freedoms and rights of
Islamic organisations and actors are not only explained by pressures born out of nation-
alist and Islamophobic tendencies in Russian society. They are also part of the restrictions
on religious activity that have intensified since the end of the 1990s, which reflect both the
strengthening position of the ROC and political authoritarianisation in general.
The authoritarianisation of Russian society and the governance of Islam
Since the beginning of his first presidency in 2000, one of the most consistent features in
the politics of Vladimir Putin has been the centralisation of power and gradual increase
in repressive policies against anyone who criticises him. In fact, it was his promise to
restore order that made Putin popular after the turbulent years of the 1990s, which
had made many Russians sceptical of liberalism as it was perceived in Russia. Adopting
a process of authoritarianisation, Russia has moved closer to authoritarian regimes
characterised by restraints on political activity and interest representation, leading to
weak political mobilisation, control of associational life, the legitimacy of emotion
rather than ideology, and relatively unrestrained leadership (Levitsky and Way 2010;
Gilbert and Mohseni 2011). Vladimir Gel’man notes that
[i]n the 2000s, the authorities resorted to co-opting and isolating public actors who dis-
agreed with government policy. Now those methods have been replaced with a “politics
of fear,” the demonstrative intimidation of those who advocate against the regime, the sys-
tematic public discrediting of the Kremlin’s opponents, and the selective prosecution of
opposition activists and their allies. (Gel’man 2015, 7)
Similar methods targeting undesired actors and court cases, which may occasionally
seem almost random, have been used as obstacles to the proper functioning of religion.
However, the political elite also selectively uses religion to bolster its legitimacy, and in
return, provides privileges for certain churches or religions. Even minority religions may
prosper if they are considered useful and not a threat to the power structures. Karrie
J. Koesel (2014), who examined Russia and China as case studies of authoritarian
regimes, argues that the relationship between the authorities and religious organisations
in these countries often follows interest-based interactions in which both make use of
their resources and gain benefits.2 Nevertheless, such opportunities are usually not
open for all religious groups. Moreover, the power imbalances in such cooperation
efforts require more concessions from religious organisations than from the state.
The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, introduced in Russia
in 1997, guarantees the right of conscience but has also set new prerequisites for the regis-
tration of religious organisations, such as the requirement that a religious group must
have maintained a continuous presence in Russian territory for at least fifteen years.
For Muslim communities, and for religious freedom in general, a more crucial turning
2For example, the state guarantees that a religious organisation can function by, for example, providing it with the oppor-
tunity to maintain premises for its operations. Religious organisations can fulfil different tasks ranging from providing a
patriotic education to providing certain social services.
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point was the introduction of a law generally referred to as an ‘anti-extremism law’ in
2002.3 Extremist activity is defined, for example, as ‘propaganda on the exclusiveness,
superiority or deficiency of individuals on the basis of their attitude to religion, social,
racial, national, religious or linguistic identity’. Needless to say, statements regarding
the superiority of one’s own faith can easily be found in many religious publications.
Thus, the authorities now have weapons to ban a wide range of religious activities and
publications for being extremist, which they have done on several occasions (Fagan
2013, 158–162). Many such verdicts have been criticised by human rights organisations
and even by such institutions as the European Court of Human Rights (2018).
Local authorities can exercise considerable power with respect to court decisions
banning certain publications or organisations as extremist. Publications that are declared
extremist in any local court are automatically added to the federal list of banned litera-
ture. The situation has led to such controversial implementation of the law as the banning
of a Russian translation of the Koran,4 although this decision met with widespread dis-
approval and was later overturned. In 2015, President Putin signed into effect a law that
prevents the banning of established holy scriptures – with the Bible, Koran, Jewish
Tanakh and Tibetan Buddhist Kangyur specifically being mentioned – as extremist.
Thus, low-level authorities may go further than the political elite in their efforts,
which further complicates religious understandings of the difference between ‘allowed’
and ‘prohibited’ publications.
Authorities have banned publications and blocked news portals under the pretence of
extremism, seized media outlets by various means (Freedom House 2018) and refused to
register certain political parties on the dubious grounds that they violated formalities.
Yet, these kinds of measures must be exercised carefully so as not to provoke widespread
resistance. Instead, a more effective method is to marginalise oppositional parties and
media by having some co-opted actors create ‘oppositional parties’ that are actually
loyal to the Kremlin and by dominating TV space with entertaining, well-funded chan-
nels that take direction from the political elite (Petrov, Lipman, and Hale 2014).
In a similar vein, control of Islamic activity in Russia is orchestrated both by banning
undesirable organisations and by supporting, or even creating, organisations that are
unquestionably loyal to the authorities but do not necessarily enjoy much support
among Russian Muslims. For example, in 2010, soon after the head of the Central Spiri-
tual Board of Muslims of Russia (CPBMR), Talgat Tadjuddin, had proposed the unifica-
tion of the largest umbrella organisations, the muftiates, a new organisation called the
Russian Association of Islamic Association of Islamic Accord (RAIAIA) was founded.
The founders of the organisation included representatives from the spiritual boards of
the Stavropol, Perm, Mordovia, Ural and Ryazansk oblasts, though the Ryazansk mufti-
ate soon announced that it would not be involved in the new organisation. The organ-
isation never gained much support. Immediately after its establishment, an eminent
scholar of Islam in Russia, Alexey Malashenko, characterised its impact of the organis-
ation on Russian Muslims as ‘practically zero’ (2010), as it did not enjoy much
support among ordinary Muslims (see also Bekkin 2020). Malashenko explained the
3‘On Combating Extremist Activity’, ‘O protivodeistvii ekstremistskoi deyatel’nosti’, No. 114 FZ.
4The translation of the Koran by Elmir Kuliev, a well-known scholar and Orientalist, was banned by a court in the pro-
vincial city of Novorossiysk.
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initiative in the context of the authorities’ attempts to control Islam, especially by weak-
ening one of the most influential Islamic organisations in Russia, the Council of Muftis of
Russia (CMR), which would have gained more influence through the unification of the
muftiates. According to Malashenko, while the authorities had earlier preferred the idea
of having a single Islamic organisation as an interlocutor, some had since begun to see
divisions within the Islamic community as beneficial for governance. Russian Muslims
widely denounced RAIAIA as a ‘puppet’ organisation (Malashenko 2010), and similar
accusations have been targeted at another group, the Islamic community’s Assembly
of Muslims of Russia, which was established in 2014.
However, it would be misleading to draw too sharp of a line between the ‘co-opted’
and ‘independent’ Islamic organisations and actors. Virtually all Islamic organisations
have had to make compromises when, for example, addressing such problems as dis-
crimination against Muslims or misuse of the anti-extremism law. It is also important
to note that Islamic actors are not just acting based on their own convictions, but on
the orders of certain authorities, even when they, for example, vilify other Muslims
and Islamic organisations or refuse to defend individuals and organisations that are
charged with extremism. As James C. Scott (1985) has pointed out, for social groups
that do not possess realistic opportunities to subvert hegemonic systems, the lack of
open resistance and confrontation does not necessarily mean that they comply with
those systems. Using the notion of ‘everyday resistance’, he demonstrates how the
oppressed can use a wide array of subtle methods to counter oppression with a disguised
resistance. The established norms and codes of behaviour, the ‘public transcript’, can be
challenged through ‘hidden transcripts’ that take the form of, for example, metaphors,
euphemisms and linguistic tricks to create identity and dignity for the community.
Thus, ‘calculated conformity’ and ‘routine compliance’ may be seen not only as a neces-
sity, but also as strategic means to cover other forms of subversive action (Scott 1985, 241,
278).
The self-governance of Islamic actors
Defending organisations or texts that are either accused of extremism or banned can
easily attract charges of sympathising with radical views. Criticising verdicts on extre-
mism or terrorism may even lead to legal persecutions. For example, in 2006 the
renowned human rights organisation Memorial published on its website an analysis of
the banning of four Hizb ut-Tahrir publications by mufti Nafigulla Ashirov. The
author did not express support for Hizb ut-Tahrir and the text did not contain any
direct quotations from the banned publications. Nevertheless, Memorial received a
warning for extremist activity even though ‘[w]hat the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office
found extremist was a mere expression of disagreement with the Supreme Court’ (Ver-
khovsky 2008). Reposting any material banned as extremist, even when the context lacks
any evidence of endorsement, may bring legal charges. Statements and publications that
authorities feel justify terrorism are punished with imprisonment for up to seven years.
One of the cornerstones of such a ‘politics of fear’ is that even high-level Islamic
leaders cannot assume to be safe and even small transgressions may have serious conse-
quences, as the following example demonstrates. In 2016, the former head imam of the
Yardyam Mosque in Moscow, Makhmud Velitov, was accused of providing a public
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justification of terrorism (Article 205.2). The prosecution based its case on a sermon he
had delivered three years earlier, in which, as part of the commemoration of deceased
Muslims, he described a recently killed Dagestanian activist, Abdulla Gappaev, as a
good Muslim. However, after the death of Gappaev the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Dagestan declared that he had been a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is forbidden
in Russia (Vatchagaev 2016). In 2017, Velitov was sentenced to three years in prison
for supporting terrorism. He was released from prison in 2019, though with some restric-
tions, including, for example, a prohibition on his travelling outside Moscow, where he is
registered.
The extent to which Muslim public figures take risks when they make critical com-
ments varies. It depends on what they have to lose personally and what kinds of respon-
sibilities they have with their affiliations. People in top positions must take into account
that they are not risking only their personal careers by making statements that are con-
sidered aggressive or unpatriotic but may also be jeopardising their organisations. The
fear of legal consequences is one of the main reasons for the self-censorship of Islamic
actors, but not the only one. Another factor has to do with the material and immaterial
incentives provided by the state.
Nationwide, the state subsidises Islamic activities through the Fund for the Support of
Islamic Culture, Science and Education. The most prominent muftis compete for places
in such high-profile institutions as the Public Chamber and over invitations to state
events. Such invitations, which indicate the Kremlin’s favour toward a given muftiate,
translate as a willingness to listen to its viewpoints. Maintaining good relationships
with the authorities is no less important on the local level. Such relations guarantee pro-
tection from arbitrary legal proceedings and may help prominent Muslims or Muslim
organisations secure material benefits, such as land for religious buildings, support for
the restoration of a historical building or funding through joint projects. The support
of authorities is also crucial in internal rivalries, such as disputes over the ownership
of mosques. In post-Soviet Russia, where unlawful seizures of mosques by competing
Muslim groups have not been uncommon, it is possible that occupiers receive signals
of approval from the authorities.
Inclusion in official networks helps ensure Muslim organisations that their voice will
be heard and influences any political decision-making concerning them, but such
cooperation with the authorities may also have drawbacks. The tendency of Russian
authorities to prefer a certain Islamic organisation easily creates internal rivalries (Aita-
murto and Gaidukov 2018). Several studies demonstrate that in many European
countries, engaging in cooperation with the state or the authorities may damage the
credibility of Muslim organisations in the eyes of the Muslim community. Community
members may accuse such organisations of having been co-opted by the state to serve
its own interests and of working to exclude other Muslim organisations (Martikainen
2007; Loobuyck, Debeer, and Meier 2013). In Russia as well, several studies argue that
muftiates do not always enjoy much support or even respect among ordinary believers
and that muftis are often considered to be more ‘administrators’ than religious leaders
(Braginskaia 2012, 615; Benussi 2018; Bekkin 2020).
A common concern within Muslim communities both in Russia and the rest of
Europe is that external pressures from the authorities, media and so forth have begun
to influence organisations too much, inducing them to surrender control to outsiders
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who wish to ‘change’ Islam (Kortmann and Rosenow-Williams 2013, 54). Given that
both in Russia and in Europe, a ‘good’ Muslim citizen is often docile and apolitical,
the internalisation of the hegemonic language by the privileged Islamic partners of the
state not only creates divisions within Muslim communities, but also weakens their
ability to act as political subjects (Topolski 2018). For example, by countering the nar-
rowing definition of freedom of speech and especially mobilising others to do so, a
person moves from the category of being a ‘good’ Muslim to being a ‘bad’ Muslim in
the eyes of authorities, thereby laying the groundwork for additional hindrances to col-
lective action.
Similar dilemmas have been discerned by Fredrika Prina (2015) in her study of ethnic
diaspora communities in Russia. She acknowledges that cooperation with the authorities
has the capacity to empower minority communities and enhance their organisational and
political participation skills, but she also discusses the price of such collaboration.
According to Prina, Russian discussions about ethnic minority activism are characterised
by sharp divisions into black-and-white poles of ‘tolerance’ and ‘extremism,’ in which
everything non-conventional is quickly interpreted as extremism. Cooperation with
the state entails consenting to refrain from criticism. Moreover, agreeing to use the dis-
course of power, such as interpreting dissent as extremism or minority politics as cultural
development and not as a struggle for political rights, reproduces its language and inter-
pretive frameworks, thus serving the interests of the state more than those of the minority
(Prina 2015).
However, it can be argued that adopting the hegemonic discourse does not preclude
contestations over the hegemonic meanings and interpretations embedded within the
discourse, as has been suggested by James Scott (1985) in his discussion of hidden
scripts and meanings. Russian discussions of patriotism are a prime example of this prac-
tice. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Russian state has invested heavily in policies
that aim to promote patriotism, including a generous allocation of funds for patriotic
education. Thus, ‘patriotism’ has become an attractive label for groups seeking
funding for their activities as well as social recognition for providing a valuable contri-
bution to society. While ‘patriotism’ is a value subscribed to by countless Russian pro-
jects, organisations, politicians and other public actors, it does not mean that all
subscribe to a uniform interpretation of the term. The label is used instrumentally for
various projects, which may have little in common with the meaning of ‘patriotism’ in
state discourses, with a good example being various neo-Pagan patriotic organisations.
The concept is also used in critiques of the dominant hegemonic discourse. As a conse-
quence, ‘patriotism does not necessarily lead to increased engagement in support of the
authorities’ (Daucé et al. 2015, 5).
The hegemonic discourse, even in the form of such exclusive, normative categories as
the division into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam, may create new opportunities for Muslim com-
munities to strengthen their legitimacy, but it may also come at such a price as, for
example, community members having doubts about the integrity of local representative
organisations. In his study of the Gülen movement in the West, Lacey (2014) notes that
the image of moderate Islam can be used in a strategic way to enhance its position and to
gain support among non-Muslims. The content and emphases of the attributes attached
to ‘good Islam’ vary in different countries and societies, however. ‘Moderate’ (umerenyii)
is a central denominator of ‘good Islam’ in Russia in a similar way as it is in Europe or
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North America. Yet, in contrast to those places such themes as gender equality or the
rights of sexual and gender minorities hardly ever appear in Russian conceptualisations
of ‘good Islam’; rather, such values as loyalty, the indigenous nature of the faith, patrio-
tism and commitment to ‘traditional values’ are promoted (Aitamurto 2015). In fact,
values and statements that are considered illiberal in the West may be seen as socially
acceptable in Russia. A good example can be found in one book on the history of
Islam in post-Soviet Russia written by the former executive secretary of the Interreligious
Council of Russia and a controversial Orthodox scholar, Roman Silant’yev (2007). He
describes how the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia had begun to lose
its support both within the Muslim community and among the political elite in 2005:
‘The authority of the Supreme Mufti was significantly elevated by his statements
against the gay parade in Moscow. Talgat Tadjuddin harshly condemned the organisers
of the event, reminding them that the Prophet Muhammad had ordered that homosex-
uals be killed’ (Silant’yev 2007, 187). What is revealing in this quote is the taken-for--
granted assumption that the condemnation of homosexuality, even in such an
aggressive manner, would be looked upon favourably by the political elite and society
in general.
Policing the borders of the ‘acceptable’: examples of ‘disloyalty’ or
‘aggressiveness’
Next, I will provide some examples of the negotiations over patriotism and lack of loyalty.
The analysis focuses on the ways in which accusations of ‘disloyalty’ and ‘aggressiveness’
effectively narrow what is permissible for Islamic actors to say. As the analysis shows,
numerous different actors, including other Muslims, are involved in such governance
activities. Consequently, policing also takes in the form of self-governance, i.e., individ-
uals begin to censor themselves consciously or unconsciously.
Dissident thinking as militant revolutionism
Regularly promoting oppositional political views causes problems for Islamic organis-
ations and activists. Likewise, Islamic publications must assess the risks of publishing
critical reports about the political elite or authorities. For example, in 2016 one of the
most popular Islamic news portals in the country, Golos Islama (The Voice of Islam),
was blocked by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information
Technology and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor). The deputy prosecutor
general named three grounds for blocking the site. The first two had to do with the ‘com-
ments by readers of an extremist nature, calling for violating the legislation of the Russian
Federation’ and the reposting of an interview with the leader of Al-Nusra Front, pub-
lished originally in Al Jazeera. The third accusation addressed the general line of Golos
Islama:
[T]he publications are characterised by tendentious material, which [takes] a hostile attitude
to certain social groups, in particular to the representatives of law enforcement, regulatory
agencies and the leadership of the Russian Federation, as well as to the foreign and domestic
policy of Russia. (Han 2016)
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The law against extremism refers to the incitement of hatred against ‘social groups’; in
some legal cases, ‘social groups’ has been interpreted to include ‘law enforcement, regu-
latory agencies and the leadership of the Russian Federation’. Effectively, this kind of
reading of the law seemingly prevents all criticism of the political elite and authorities.
Moreover, in March 2019 a new law came into effect that criminalised all expressions
of ‘disrespect’ for Russian society, the government, official symbols, the constitution or
any state body.
In addition to criticising the current political elite and authorities, envisioning
different types of regimes or political systems can also result in legal measures. In a
closed session in February 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation banned
fifteen Islamic organisations for being terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda, the
Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tharir. According to the Supreme Court decision,
Hizb ut-Tahrir
has as its aim the removal of non-Islamic governments and the establishment of Islamic gov-
ernment on a worldwide scale by means of reviving the “Worldwide Islamic Caliphate”,
initially in regions with a majority Muslim population, including in Russia and the countries
of the CIS [the Commonwealth of Independent States].5
The verdict also accuses Hizb ut-Tahrir of spreading ‘militant Islamic propaganda,’ but
provides little justification for this claim within the decision itself.
The verdict has been criticised by human rights organisations and activists on the basis
that Hizb ut-Tahrir has consistently announced that it does not advocate militant revo-
lution or terrorist activity. For example, the head of the human rights organisation
SOVA, Alexander Verkhovsky, has noted that by the time of the verdict, Hizb ut-
Tahrir had not committed any terrorist actions or made plans for such, and that the auth-
orities’ later discoveries of arms and plans for acts of violence by the members of the
organisation are ‘questionable’ (Verkhovskii 2018). Verkhovskii does point out,
though that several publications by Hizb ut-Tahrir contain anti-Semitic remarks, and
therefore, the decision to ban it for being extremist and inciting interethnic hatred
would be quite justifiable. However, the court’s use of the term ‘terrorist’ and the text
defending its decision clearly state that the reason for the ban is the organisation’s aim
to overthrow the current Russian democratic regime. Following this logic, organisations
that advocate the restoration of monarchism in Russia should also be banned, which has
not been suggested in public. The decision also confuses criminal actions with militant
rhetoric, acts of violence with calls to change the regime model, which is also not uncom-
mon in Western discussions about Islam (Modood 2005, 205).
Assertiveness as aggression
In the 1990s, Muslims actively sought to gain a more established position in the political
life of Russia. New parties or movements like the Party of Islamic Revival, Nur, the Union
of Muslims of Russia and Refakh took part in parliamentary elections, albeit with very
modest results. In 2001, a new law banned the creation of political parties based on eth-
nicity or religion, thus compelling Islamic activists to channel their political activity into
5February 14, 2003, GKPI 03–116.
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existing parties. However, already since the beginning of the millennium the majority of
Islamic leaders, and the most prominent organisations in particular, have shown little
interest in political initiative apart from expressing support for the ruling elite (Mala-
shenko 2009, 248–250). In a similar vein, demands for greater recognition of Muslim
minorities have diminished.
One of the few vociferous Islamic intellectuals who continued oppositional political
activity in the 2000s was the chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia, Geidar
Dzhemal. His political philosophy consisted of a peculiar mix of leftist, rightist, ultra-
conservative and Islamic elements as well as conspiracy theories. In his writings,
Dzhemal envisioned a global revolution based on Islam. Dzemal remained a rather mar-
ginal figure in the Islamic establishment in Russia, both because of his oppositional
stance and because, unlike the majority of Russian Muslims, he was a Shia Muslim.
Nevertheless, he gained much nationwide visibility as a frequent guest commentator
on various talk shows on the main TV channels, and his blogs and vlogs also had audi-
ences among ordinary Muslims (Laruelle 2016). In 2005, Dzhemal and the Islamic Com-
mittee of Russia suggested that the Christian symbols on the emblem of Russia should be
removed in recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the state.
The idea was supported by, among others, Nafigulla Ashirov from the CMR and a
well-known translator of the Koran, Valeriya Prokhorova.
However, the proposal also received some criticism and indeed ultimately proved
somewhat unrealistic. Typically, criticism of the proposal was framed along the lines
of two themes that are common also in other cases where Muslims have demanded
more rights: the first is the claim that any contestation of the hegemony of the ROC
bears the risk of creating interreligious conflicts, while the second is the argument that
such suggestions must have been orchestrated from abroad and are thus targeted
against the Russian state. These interpretative frameworks and underlying assumptions
were also adopted by many Islamic leaders. For example, the head of the CMR in Russia,
Ravil’ Gainutdin, echoed these concerns when he stated that ‘the muftiate feels that the
attempts to bring changes to the established national symbols may lead to an unwanted
rise in tensions in a multinational and multi-confessional society’ (Muftii Gainutdin
2005). The press secretary for CMR, Radik Amirov, concluded that the statement
reminded him of the call for ‘Muslims to create another Chechnya’ [war] in Russia (Pya-
tunina and Yakovleva 2005). Consequently, the strategy of seeking legitimacy by applying
hegemonic frameworks to their demands may entail the cost of depriving them of much
agency even within Islamic circles.
Criticism as unpatriotic activity
For Islamic actors, tackling Islamophobia is not easy because such statements routinely
raise accusations of being unpatriotic. An example of this can be found in the public dis-
putes resulting from a radio interview with Ravil’ Gainutdin in 2010. In the interview,
Gainutdin argued that the new RAIAIA muftiate had been created to complicate the
planned unification of the main muftiates. He claimed that Aleksei Grishin, the chief
advisor of the Administration of the President in the Council for Coordination with Reli-
gious Organizations, had played an active role in its creation, a figure who Gainutdin
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described as being an ‘Islamophobe’. Gainutdin also addressed the obstacles faced by
Islamic organisations when building new mosques.
In understanding that today Islam is a major factor in Russia (…) there are attempts to halt
the growth of Islam. This manifests itself already in daily life, like in refusals to grant land for
building mosques in big cities. For example, in Moscow, where more than two million
Muslims live, great tension can be felt. Because of the lack of mosques, Muslims have to
conduct their celebratory namaz [prayer] in the streets, on tramlines, even in churchyards.
In this way, the humiliation of Muslims, the politics of violating their civil rights, continues.
(Gainutdin, quoted in Karimova 2010)
Gainutdin is one of if not the most influential Islamic leaders in Russia. In comparison to
many other muftis, such as e.g., Talgat Tdjuddin or Albir Krganov, he has been relatively
active in addressing the problems that Muslims face in Russia, like the banning of Islamic
literature. However, this sharp form of criticism – and especially the direct attack on the
administrations of Moscow and the president – was somewhat unusual for him. When
Russian Islamic leaders criticise the authorities, their accusations are usually still
couched in loyalty to the political elite and their politics, such as blaming authorities
for simply deviating from the official line of the President of the Russian Federation.
No high-level authorities commented on his statement. Instead, rival Islamic leaders has-
tened to disapprove of Gainutdin’s claims. The head of the Central Spiritual Board of
Muslims of Russia, Talgat Tadjuddin, accused him of provocation:
Of what kind of insults to Muslim can one speak when mosques are built in the country, the
systems of education and madrassahs are opened, in all mosques the foundations of Islam
are taught and, among the youth, spiritual work is conducted in order to counter the
entrance to radical Islam, terrorism? There are no obstacles for law-abiding Islam in the
country. (Bogatykh 2010)
The mufti of RAIAIA, Magomedali Khuzin, insinuated that Gainutdin’s words could be
interpreted as illegal extremism:
When the person who calls himself a sheik and the representative of the Council of Muftis
makes statements that inflame and pour oil or gasoline on fire, I think there should be made,
firstly, a juridical assessment of these words and, secondly, a political assessment of the
recent doings and sayings of this gentleman. (Bogatykh 2010)
Gainutdin’s criticism was viewed as unpatriotic activity, and again some accusations were
made that he had been acting on behalf of foreign powers. Ismail Berdiev from the Coor-
dinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus stated that, ‘Either the person has
become crazy or he has received such a big grant from foreign sources that he took
the risk of throwing such a serious accusation against the state’ (Bogatykh 2010).
Aleksei Grishin did not comment on this statement. However, a few months later,
when Gainutdin again used the word ‘Islamophobia’ in his criticism of ultra-nationalist
and xenophobic activity, Grishin blatantly dismissed all discussion of Islamophobia in
Russia as an unpatriotic activity:
This theme [Islamophobia] is very convenient to the enemies of Russia beyond the borders
of the Russian Federation as well. […] It is completely inappropriate to charge the Russian
state with Islamophobia […] In what other country has the number of mosques grown 70
times over the last 20 years!. (Goble 2011)
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These cases demonstrate that in contemporary Russia, claims of Islamophobia are reg-
ularly countered by arguing both that they are false and a priori indications of an unpa-
triotic stance. Given that questions of disloyalty and loyalty become anticipated in all
discussions about the Muslimminority, any relevant counterargument criticising policies
and measures that discriminate against Muslims must be framed in the avowal of patri-
otism. The importance of patriotism is further stressed by the fact that there are few
alternative values that would have similar weight.
During the last decade, the discourse on human rights has been undermined in several
ways in Russia. In such international institutions as the United Nations, the ROC has
actively promoted adjusting the universal concept of human rights to fit only ‘traditional
cultures’, thus introducing different kinds of caveats (Stoeckl 2016). The watering down
of the idea of human rights is connected to the authoritarianisation process in Russia.
The concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, launched in 2006 by the first deputy chief of
the Russian Presidential Administration, Vladislav Surkov, refers to the centralisation
of power, but it also insinuates that if international norms are seen to violate the sover-
eignty of Russia, they will not be followed (Ziegler 2012, 412).
With respect to Muslims, the concept of human rights is reversed in two ways in
public discussions. First, it is increasingly common to encounter in the media and in
public discussions arguments suggesting that the principles of universal human rights
cannot be applied to certain Islamic groups or Muslims because of their own intolerance
or aggressiveness (on similar trends in Europe, see Cesari 2012, 431). The other line of
argumentation maintains that the appeals to human rights are misused by radical
Muslims in order to cover their actual motives, and therefore, such appeals are not
sincere or genuine. For example, in 2011, in the wake of terrorist activities in Kazan,
massive controlling measures were implemented against local Muslims, including count-
less raids and arrests. As a response, local Muslims and human rights activists organised
demonstrations against the trampling of the rights of Muslims. The account of one such
demonstration by a well-known scholar of Islam, Rais Suleimanov (2012), dismisses their
claims. According to him, the event was organised by ‘fundamentalists and separatists’,
who had simply ‘decided to play the “defending human rights” card’. Such statements
deny the inalienable and universal nature of human rights, thereby watering down the
legitimacy of the appeals to this moral principle.
Discourses on loyalism and patriotism as a means of defending the rights
of Muslims
For Russian Muslims, patriotic rhetoric is necessary for countering any suspicions of dis-
loyalty and subversiveness, but it may also present new opportunities to defend their pos-
ition and interests. Russian Muslims use the theme of patriotism in countless ways to
make claims of loyalty and apply it for a myriad of goals. For example, the role of
Islam in Russian history can be juxtaposed with ‘non-traditional’ religions when nego-
tiating certain privileges. Funding for Islamic education or publishing can be sought
by claiming that developing native, Russian forms of Islam functions as a shield
against foreign influences.
The symbolic power that World War II has gained as a central trope in the nationalist
narrative of Russia’s heroic past (Malinova 2017) has made it an attractive rhetorical
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strategy in different kinds of negotiation. For example, in December 2016 the Adminis-
tration of the Leningrad Oblast’s Committee of Youth Politics organised an emergency
training at a local medical college. As a part of the training, the students were taken as
hostages by a group dressed in cloths that, as the complaint cited below states, clearly
referred to Muslim radicals. This event was condemned by the head of the Islamic organ-
isation Mekka and Tatar activist, Rinat Valiev, who sent a letter about the incident to the
governor of the Leningrad Oblast. The letter began:
Together with others, Muslims survived the years of the fascist blockade and took part in the
defense of Leningrad. Tens of thousands of Muslims, including Tatars, risked their necks on
the battlefields and in the territory of the Leningrad region. Our grandfathers, fathers and
ancestors defended our lands from the fascist plague that did not spare their lives.
The city of Leningrad suffered all the hardships of heavy occupation, and thanks to the fra-
ternity of our ancestors, the representatives of various confessions on the battlefields, [the
sacrifice] has borne fruit. Our lands are cleared of filth, the complete annihilation of
fascism […] It would seem that on the ground covered by the blood of our ancestors,
there should be no more manifestations of fascism, interracial and interreligious war, [or]
hatred of our neighbors. At least our ancestors dreamed of it. But […] they were wrong.
(Muslim 2016)
Valiev refers to the common Soviet and Russian narrative of victory in World War II
having been achieved together through the cooperation and sacrifices of ethnic and reli-
gious minorities. Consequently, these minorities can claim rights to land ‘covered in the
blood’ of their ‘ancestors’. Tatars and other Muslims, whose ancestors fought in the war,
are presented as equally entitled to be included in the ‘us’ of Russian society. Due to the
almost sacred nature of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and its veterans in contemporary
Russian society, this argument is difficult to counter in socially acceptable ways.
Islamic leaders adopt the general patriotic rhetoric and such topics as pride in national
identity to call attention to the Russian tradition of peaceful coexistence of religions and
ethnicities. At the same time, they hold the political elite accountable for aspiring to this
ideal. In 2012, a school in Stavropol forbid Muslim girls from wearing the hijab on school
grounds, giving rise to much societal discussion. The right to wear a hijab in public was
artfully defended by Ravil’ Gainutdin in a speech at the meeting of the Eurasian Islamic
Council in Istanbul in 2012:6
Unfortunately, today we hear statements according to which Russia has allegedly become
enemy number one for Muslims. Every year we build and open tens of mosques, madras-
sahs, Muslim cultural centres and universities. In the post-Soviet era, Russian Muslims
were the first ones to get the right to be photographed in hijabs for passports. And today,
when Europe is moving towards limiting religious freedom, Russia is taking consistent
steps in the protection of the rights and feelings of believers. (Gainutdin 2012)
Gainutdin provides useful PR arguments for the Russian government vis-à-vis Europe:
while Europe is ‘limiting religious freedom’, Russia grants Muslim women the right to
be photographed in hijabs. However, his juxtaposition of Russia and Europe can also
be read as a demand that the Russian state assume responsibility for preserving this right.
6Despite Gainutdin’s effort, the Russian state has adopted a more restrictive stance toward the wearing of hijabs in recent
years. In 2012, President Putin argued that the hijab did not belong to ‘traditional Islam in Russia’, and in 2015 the
Supreme Court granted schools the right to ban hijabs.
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Conclusions
Islam holds a recognised position in Russian society. The state provides financial support
to Islamic organisations for publishing literature and organising religious activities. It
would be difficult to imagine top politicians disagreeing with the fact that Islam is an inte-
gral part of Russian history and tradition. Yet at the same time, the rights of Russian
Muslims are also under serious attack due to the growing popularity of Islamophobia
and the process of political authoritarianisation in Russia, which affect both civil
society and minority religions.
The authoritarianisation process in Russia manifests itself in the extensive legal
instruments being employed and an increasing readiness to use them to repress
Islamic organisations, individuals and activity. However, Russian authorities also
resort to softer measures, such as favouring weak substitutions for interest represen-
tation and persuading Islamic organisations to refrain from criticism by providing
them with different kinds of incentives. Charges of and verdicts on extremist or terror-
ist activity can be passed rather easily, but perhaps an even more effective method is
intimidation by means of arbitrary legal measures that silence contestation. Neverthe-
less, the tightened control is not only executed by the state. The boundaries between
what is ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ are also reproduced and negotiated in the
media and via expert discussions.
The narrowing of the scope of what is considered admissible for Islamic leaders to say
can be seen as part of the authoritarianisation of Russian society and politics. Yet, some-
what similar trends of the intensified policing of Islamic religiosity, divisions into ‘good’
and ‘bad’ Islam (or sanctioned and unsanctioned Islamic activity), suspicions of disloy-
alty and interpretations of non-compliance as radicalism have also been noted in the
post-9/11 governance of Islam in Europe and North America. Thus, the tightening
control of Muslims in Russia reflects not only the political authoritarianisation of the
country, but the global securitisation of Islam as well.
Self-governance and peer governance gain additional weight through the securitisa-
tion of Islam and political authoritarianisation. It is not uncommon for Islamic leaders
to vilify their competitors in order to gain influence and please certain authorities.
The above-mentioned charges by rival muftis against Gainutdin for making claims of
Islamophobia are a good example of this phenomenon, as is the lack of support given
to Velitov by other Islamic leaders after he was arrested. The fear of becoming associated
with extremism, which in the worst cases may even induce charges of extremist activity,
encourages such condemnation.
The analysis presented in this article has identified certain mechanisms for the tigh-
tening of censorship in the rhetoric of Islamic leaders. In terms of the public reception
of statements made by Muslims, any criticism of the state is easily condemned as unpa-
triotic activity or hate speech against the majority, demands for constitutional rights as
disloyalty to Russia, assertiveness as aggressiveness and subscription to alternative
social ideologies as militant revolutionism. Each of these mechanisms is usually pre-
sented in discussions as part of the larger question of loyalty, with patriotism being
the ultimate value in such arguments. In fact, expressions of patriotism and loyalty
serve as an implicit prerequisite for religious organisations seeking a voice on the
public stage in contemporary Russia.
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In the patriotic rhetoric of Islamic leaders, Russian history, contemporary Russian
society and the political elite are often celebrated in a way that seemingly ignores the
existence of such problems as discrimination against Muslims or violations of religious
freedom. However, patriotism also serves as a value that Muslims use to anchor their
demands and arguments, and in this way, it also opens new avenues for them to
defend their position and influence public discussions. Hence, patriotism functions as
a public transcript within which a hidden transcript is employed to raise the conscious-
ness of the community and to challenge dominant paradigms.
Reminders of the PR value of the Muslim minority and religious tolerance serve as a
way to counter discrimination against Muslims. Emphasis on the historical role of
Muslims in Russian culture leads to the conclusion that mosques are a traditional part
of Russian urban spaces. With this patriotic rhetoric, Muslims also influence negotiations
on the cultural and political identity of Russia. For example, Russian Muslims usually
support the idea of Russia as a unique culture that incorporates both Eastern and
Western traditions. This rhetoric lends support to Russia’s foreign policy aim of challen-
ging Western dominance through the idea of a multi-polar world. Descriptions of the
contributions of non-Slavic people, such as Tatars, to the history of Russia, including
the wars it has waged, are set against the nationalist ideology of ‘Russia for [ethnic] Rus-
sians’ (Rossiya dlya russkikh).
The analysis has demonstrated various ways in which negotiation and contestation
can take place amidst tightening controls. This process creates some new opportunities
for Russian Muslims. However, these opportunities do not substitute for the damage
done by repressing Islamic activities. It also seems reasonable to suggest that even for
those Islamic organisations that are able to benefit from the opportunities of cooperating
with the state, the adoption of dominant values and frameworks may carry the risk of
alienating ordinary believers and losing their support.
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